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Abstract
This article examines the so-called companization of cooperative law. Companization 
refers to the phenomenon of national cooperative laws adopting elements of effi-
ciency-oriented company legislation; i.e., cooperative societies seem to be slowly 
transforming into cooperative companies. Companization is a widely recognized 
issue, but there is little research on the topic. This is unfortunate, since studying com-
panization helps us understand the relationship between cooperative law and company 
law, and, furthermore, it serves as a gateway to the investigation of the essential nature 
of cooperatives and why we need them.
This article examines the companization of cooperative law using the Finnish 
Cooperatives Act (FCA) as a framework for analysis. The FCA is a good instrument 
for elaborating what companization means in practice, since cooperatives play a larger 
role in the Finnish economy than anywhere else in the world and since companization 
has been the conscious objective of Finnish legislators. This research was conducted 
by reflecting on the FCA in relation to the international cooperative law doctrine, 
using the ICA’s cooperative principles as a benchmark. The findings reveal many 
signs of companization, and this does not only concern Finland: Companization is a 
global trend which requires further attention.
1. Introduction
Globalization has without doubt a significant impact on all economic enterprises, from 
private entrepreneurs to business organizations such as companies and cooperatives. 
It has, however, been argued that the globalization of production favors ‘highly 
mobile,’ capital-based companies and works to the disadvantage of person-based 
entities like cooperatives.1 In fact, in the late 1990s Henry Hansmann already pre-
dicted that traditional cooperatives would lose the competition against other business 
entities, especially companies.2 This prediction was based on the assumption that 
cooperatives are less adaptable than companies to changes in the business environ-
* LL.D., Adjunct Professor of Civil Law and Commercial Law, University of Helsinki, Faculty of 
Law.
1 Hagen Henrÿ, Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation, 16-17 (3rd ed., Geneva; ILO, 2012).
2 Henry Hansmann, Osuustoimintayritykset teoriassa ja käytännössä 3 Kansantaloudellinen aika-
kauskirja 483 (1999).
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ment.3 Moreover, as Bengt Holmström has claimed, significant changes in the eco-
nomic environment are compromising the foundations of traditional cooperatives, 
since the interests of their members are diverging.4 Today, it is perhaps even possible 
to argue that the classical cooperative business model is facing an ideological crisis 
(or challenge)5, since the expectations of modern capital markets are not concordant 
with the social dimensions of the cooperative movement. It is important to understand 
that the growing internationalization of cooperatives – which is an inevitable result 
of globalization – is not occurring through international cooperation, but through 
foreign direct investment, i.e., through investment which the cooperative movement 
has traditionally resented.6
In company law theory, the modern shareholder-oriented ‘company’ or ‘corpora-
tion’ is often praised – at least in terms of efficiency – as the ultimate form of asso-
ciation.7 It is also widely acknowledged that national company laws are – at least to 
some extent – converging towards a homogenous ‘Delawarean’ model, which is con-
sidered superior in terms of competitiveness and flexibility, i.e., which is believed to 
be the most attractive legal framework for firms aiming for profit maximization.8 This 
3 Some authors, however, claim that in times of (economic) crisis cooperatives can be more resil-
ient than investor-owned enterprises, i.e., companies. See, e.g., Carlo Borzaga & Giulia Galera, Promot-
ing the Understanding of Cooperatives for a Better World. Euricse’s Contribution to the International 
Year of Cooperatives, 7-8 and 10 (University of Trento; Euricse, 2012) and Johnston Birchall & Lou 
Hammond Ketilson, Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in Times of Crisis, 13-14 (Geneva; 
ILO, 2009).
4 Bengt Holmström, Osuuskuntien tulevaisuus yritysmaailman murroksen valossa 3 Kansantaloud-
ellinen aikakauskirja 500 (1999).
5 See, e.g., Ian MacPherson, What Difference does a Century Make? Considering Some Crises in 
the International Cooperative Movement, 1900 and 2000, 017ǀ11 Euricse Working Paper 11 (2010) 
<http://www.euricse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/1304355382_n1714.pdf> (accessed 23 October 
2018), who cites the main ‘ideological challenges’ of the cooperative movement as being the need to 
establish more clearly (1) the distinct qualities that separate cooperatives from other organizations, (2) 
the different roles they can play within society and in the economy and (3) the factors that make for 
successful cooperation.
6 Anjel Mari Errasti, Iñaki Heras, Baleren Bakaikoa & Pilar Elgoibar, The Internationalisation of 
Cooperatives: The Case of the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation 74 Annals of Public and Coopera-
tive Economics 4, 555 (2003).
7 See, e.g., Stephen M Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, 2 (New York; Foundation 
Press, 2002) and Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 89 Geo. 
L.J. 439 (2000-2001). Michael C Jensen has even claimed that ‘[w]hile cooperatives arise and persist in 
societies characterized by freedom of choice in organizational form, they have never been a significant 
factor in the economic scene.’ Michael C Jensen, A Theory of the Firm. Governance, Residual Claims, 
and Organizational Forms, 198 (Cambridge, Massachusetts; HUP, 2000).
8 In company law theory, such legal convergence is often understood as ‘regulatory competition.’ 
Although regulatory competition is usually associated with the phenomenon of U.S. states compet-
ing with one another for the most business-attractive legislation, similar competition between the EU 
Member States has also occurred. Within the EU regime, such competition in company law has been 
enabled by the decisions of the European Court of Justice. This race to the bottom/top has, however, 
not been as rigorous as the ongoing regulatory competition in the U.S. See, e.g., John Armour, Henry 
Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What is Corporate Law? in Reiner Kraakman et 
al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 21-22 (3rd ed., Oxford; 
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phenomenon does not concern only companies; hence, there are signs that also 
national cooperative laws are adopting elements of efficiency-oriented company leg-
islation. In certain countries, such as Finland, it even seems that some large coopera-
tives are beginning to resemble listed companies. This trend, which Hagen Henrÿ 
calls the ‘companization’ of cooperatives,9 has both positive and negative implica-
tions. On one hand, it allows cooperatives to become/remain competitive in markets 
dominated by stock companies. On the other hand, companization eventually reduces 
the types of enterprise to one model and weakens the capacity of cooperatives to 
facilitate sustainable development.10 Companization may also lead to a situation 
where cooperatives begin losing their cooperative identity, i.e., where participation 
is no longer personal and activity-related but based on capital contributions and own-
ership rights.11
The system of sources of cooperative law is extremely complex, and there are 
several distinct models of cooperative legislation.12 Consequently it is difficult, on a 
transnational level, to investigate the extent to which national cooperative laws have 
converged towards company laws and reveal the actual consequences of the phenom-
enon Henrÿ calls companization. In order to produce concrete and reliable research 
findings, it might, in fact, be appropriate to approach the extent and effects of com-
panization from a micro perspective, i.e., from a national perspective.13 Such research 
is crucial for transnational comparative studies on the topic, since, without national 
reflections, the analysis of companization tends to remain on a rather vague and 
abstract level.14
In this article, the research question “are cooperative societies transforming into 
cooperative companies?” is approached using the Finnish Cooperatives Act 421/2013 
OUP, 2017) and Beate Sjåfjell, Towards a Sustainable European Company Law. A Normative Analysis 
of the Objectives of EU Law, with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case, 156-157 and 258-262 (Alphen 
aan den Rijn; Kluwer Law International, 2009).
9 Henrÿ (n 1) at 5 and 10-16. Sometimes scholars use terms such as the ‘hybridization’ and ‘degen-
eration’ of the cooperative model instead of companization. Antonio Fici, Cooperative Identity and 
the Law 24 European Business Law Review 1, 38-39 (2013). These terms, however, refer to the same 
phenomenon. The beginning of the companization phenomenon dates back as far as to the early 1970s. 
Hagen Henrÿ, Co-operative Principles and Co-operative Law Arcoss the Globe in Jonathan Michie, 
Joseph R Blasi & Carlo Borzaga (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Mutual, Co-operative and Co-owned 
Business, 40 (New York; OUP, 2017) and Hans-H Münkner, Co-operative Principles and Co-operative 
Law, 34 (2nd ed., Zürich; LIT Verlag, 2015). 
10 Henrÿ (n 1) at 20 and 31.
11 Tore Fjørtoft & Ole Gjems-Onstad, Cooperative Law in Norway – Time for Codification? 45 
Scan Stud Law 123-124 (2003).
12 See, e.g., Antonio Fici, An Introduction to Cooperative Law in Dante Carcogna, Antonio Fici & 
Hagen Henrÿ (eds), International Handbook of Cooperative Law, 10-12 (Berlin; Springer, 2013) and 
Borzaga & Galera (n 3) at 14.
13 See, e.g., Ville Pönkä, The Convergence of Law: The Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act as 
an Example of the So-Called ‘Americanization’ of European Company Law 14 European Company Law 
1, 22 (2017), where the convergence of company law has been analyzed utilizing a similar perspective.
14 See also Fici (n 9) 64, who emphasizes the need to study the matter of uniformity and diversity 
in cooperative law.
VILLE PÖNKÄ80
(FCA) as an example. Finnish cooperative legislation offers an interesting framework 
for analysis for several reasons:
First, cooperatives play a significant role in Finnish society. According to statistics 
produced by the Pellervo Society (a service organization for Finnish cooperatives and 
a forum for cooperative activities), Finnish cooperatives had a total of ca. 7 million 
members in 2015, which means, given the size of the Finnish population (ca. 5.5 mil-
lion), Finland has the highest per capita number of cooperative memberships in the 
world.15 It is also worth noting that several Finnish cooperatives are relatively large 
in terms of revenue, and many of them were listed in the International Co-operative 
Alliance’s (ICA) Global300 Report 2010.16 Furthermore, Finnish cooperatives oper-
ate in most business sectors, including banking and insurance, agriculture and forestry 
and retail and consumer sales. This means that the cooperative movement is not lim-
ited to certain fields of business but is widely recognized as an alternative to the 
company form.
Second, the FCA is a modern law, and its preparatory works explicitly state that 
cooperative legislation should resemble, as much as possible, company legislation 
(and especially the Finnish Companies Act 624/2006).17 Therefore, it is logical to 
assume that Finnish cooperative law has converged towards company law. Moreover, 
the FCA deals exclusively with cooperatives, which makes it rather unique on a global 
level, since most jurisdictions do not view cooperative law as a wholly independent 
body of law.18
Finally, there appears to be a growing interest amongst Finnish scholars in coop-
erative research work and international research cooperation.19 Recent studies also 
indicate that Finnish scholars have been relatively active in the field of cooperative 
studies for some time,20 although, research in the field of cooperative law stands as 
an exception here.21 Nevertheless, the situation regarding cooperative law research 
15 Iiro Jussila, Panu Kalmi & Eliisa Troberg, Selvitys osuustoimintatutkimuksesta maailmalla ja 
Suomessa, 4 (Rauma; Painorauma Oy, 2008).
16 These cooperatives include SOK Corporation (place 27), Metsäliitto (place 37), OP Bank Group 
(place 45), Ilmarinen (place 68), Tapiola Group (place 91), Valio Group (place 126), HOK Elanto (place 
154), Tradeka (place 158), Tapiola (place 160) and Atria Group (place 165). See also Borzaga & Galera 
(n 3) 8-13 and Chiara Carini & Maurizio Carpita, Are Co-operatives Small? Evidence from the World 
Co-operative Monitor in Jonathan Michie, Joseph R Blasi & Carlo Borzaga (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Mutual, Co-operative and Co-owned Business (New York; OUP, 2017), who have illustrated the size 
of the cooperative sector as well as the economic and social impacts of cooperatives on a global scale.
17 Hallituksen esitys 185/2012 Eduskunnalle osuuskuntalaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi 19 
(Governmental bill concerning the FCA). In Finnish jurisprudence, sources of company law have even 
been used to interpret cooperative legislation. See, e.g., Jukka Mähönen & Seppo Villa, Osuuskunta 4 
(2nd ed., Helsinki; Alma Talent, 2014).
18 Fici (n 12) at 13.
19 Jussila, Kalmi and Troberg (n 15) at 38.
20 See, e.g., Jussila, Kalmi and Troberg (n 15) and Seppo Pöyhönen, Omistajaoikeudet ja omistaja-
arvo osuuskunnissa, 37-41 (Hämeenlinna; Talentum, 2011).
21 See Ville Pönkä, Osuuskuntaoikeudellisen tutkimuksen nykytila ja tulevaisuus Suomessa 2 Liike-
juridiikka 187-195 (2017). In other countries, legal scholars have also paid little attention to cooperative 
law. This applies to both national and international cooperative law research. See, e.g., Fici (n 12) at 15. 
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seems to be improving slightly, since the number of publications on the topic has 
recently increased.
This article is structured in the following way. First the roots of Finnish coopera-
tive law are briefly introduced (section 2). Then the focus shifts to the objective of 
cooperatives and the general principles of cooperative law, which are examined within 
the framework of the FCA (section 3). Here the important question is the extent to 
which the FCA has departed from the international cooperative tradition. Finally, 
section 4 summarizes the research findings and explores areas of further research.
2. A Brief Introduction to Finnish Cooperative Law
The beginning of the modern cooperative movement is universally associated with 
the establishment of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1844.22 The soci-
ety laid down principles23 which have since been revised and updated several times, 
but which are essentially the same principles upon which all co-operatives operate 
today.24 In civil law jurisdictions, cooperative legislation began to form in the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. For instance, cooperative law dates back 
to 1867 in France, 1882 in Italy, 1889 in Germany and 1931 in Spain. In Scandinavia, 
Sweden was the first country to introduce a cooperative law in 1895.
In Finland the first cooperative law came into force in 1901. The law was estab-
lished on the Rochdale Principles; however, it was bound firmly to the Finnish Com-
panies Act 22/1895, i.e., gaps in cooperative legislation were filled by company law 
norms.25 The Finnish Cooperatives Act 22/1901 (FCA 1901) consisted of just 36 sec-
tions, and even though it was quickly considered outdated in global comparisons, the 
Some authors have even claimed that the ‘scientific research and knowledge of cooperative law is gener-
ally neglected and excluded from academic teaching and research. Hans-Hermann Münkner, Worldwide 
Regulation of Co-operative Societies – An Overview, 53ǀ13 Euricse Working Paper 24 (2013) <http://
www.euricse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/1371044429_n2351.pdf> (accessed 23 October 2018).
22 See, e.g., Brett Fairbairn, The Meaning of Rochdale. The Rochdale Pioneers and the Co-operative 
Principles, 6 (Saskatchewa; Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, 1994).
23 These principles were (1) open membership, (2) democratic structure (the principle of one mem-
ber, one vote), (3) distribution of surplus in proportion to business conducted with the cooperative, (4) 
limited return on capital, (5) political and religious neutrality and (6) promotion of education.
24 See, e.g., Barbara Czachorska-Jones, Jay Gary Finkelstein & Bahareh Samsami, United States 
in Dante Carcogna, Antonio Fici & Hagen Henrÿ (eds), International Handbook of Cooperative Law 
761 (Berlin; Springer, 2013).
25 Allan Huttunen, Osuustoimintalain synty ja muutokset, 7 (Turku; Turun yliopiston oikeustieteel-
lisen tiedekunnan julkaisuja, 1990). Although the law was supplemented by the norms of company 
law, the lawmakers of the time believed it to be of utmost importance to pass legislation on ‘economic 
associations,’ since the stock company form was unsuitable for such enterprises (i.e., cooperatives). 
See, e.g., Aulis J Alanen, Hannes Gebhard, 217 (Helsinki; Yhteiskirjapaino Oy, 1964). In many other 
countries, the need for cooperative-specific legislation has also been established on the grounds of a 
similar argument. A Egger, The Cooperative Movement and Cooperative Law, XII International Labour 
Review 5 (1925).
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law was amended only twice during the 50 or so years it was in force.26 Finnish schol-
ars have, however, generally agreed that the FCA 1901 greatly furthered the develop-
ment of Finnish cooperatives and, in fact, the all-time peak in the number of registered 
cooperatives (ca 9,000) was reached in the 1950s.27
The second Finnish cooperative law was passed in 1954, and it was significantly 
influenced by the Swedish Cooperatives Act 1951:308 and by German jurisprudence 
in general. The Finnish Cooperatives Act 247/1954 (FCA 1954) was totally indepen-
dent from company legislation, and while initially consisting of 165 sections, it was, 
at the time, one of the most modern and comprehensive cooperative laws in the world: 
As mentioned above in section 1, even today most jurisdictions do not view coop-
erative law as a wholly independent body of law. The FCA 1954 was later amended 
a total of 20 times, with most changes occurring in the 1980s and 1990s, and eventu-
ally consisted of nearly 240 sections.28
The FCA 1954 was also in force for around 50 years and was followed by the third 
Finnish cooperative law, which dates from 2001. The main objective of this law 
(1488/2001, FCA 2001) was to improve the operational and financial prerequisites 
of cooperatives by updating their legal framework to reflect the requirements of the 
modern business environment. In practice, this meant that legal provisions concerning 
the incorporation and administration of cooperatives were lightened, new methods 
for securing sufficient capitalization were introduced, and many previously manda-
tory rules of law were transformed into non-mandatory provisions, i.e., provisions 
which could be altered in the bylaws of the cooperative.29 Here it is important to 
understand that while the FCA 1954 was built on a strict state-interventionist model 
to secure the interests of the welfareizing nation, in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
profitability, efficiency and competitiveness had emerged as key priorities in politics 
and law-making. This shift in the political climate, as well as the triumph of the law 
and economics movement,30 facilitated both the non-mandatorization and the com-
panization of Finnish cooperative law.31
The lifespan of the FCA 2001 was relatively short, since the current law, i.e. the 
FCA, came into force at the beginning of 2014. Legislators’ main objective was to 
further enhance the operational and financial prerequisites of cooperatives, codify 
certain practices that had evolved in jurisprudence and case law and further expand 
26 Hallituksen esitys 12/1953 osuuskuntia koskevan lainsäädännön uudistamiseksi 1 (Governmental 
bill concerning the FCA 1954).
27 Hagen Henrÿ,  Finland in Dante Carcogna, Antonio Fici & Hagen Henrÿ (eds), International 
Handbook of Cooperative Law, 374 (Berlin; Springer, 2013). See also Fici (n 9) at 38.
28 Such factors as EU membership, significant changes in Finland’s capital markets (especially lib-
eration from a bank-centered financial system), and new tax laws were some factors behind the amend-
ments to the FCA 1954. These numerous and extensive amendments led to an extremely fragmented 
law, and eventually the only possibility was to pass a wholly new cooperatives act. 
29 Hallituksen esitys 176/2001 osuuskuntalaiksi ja siihen liittyviksi laeiksi 1-3 (Governmental bill 
concerning the FCA 2001).
30 Pönkä (n 13) at 24.
31 Seppo Pöyhönen, Osuuskunta ja osuuskuntalaki, 6 (3rd ed., Helsinki; Talentum, 2013).
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the bylaw autonomy of cooperatives.32 Moreover, a new law was necessary because 
the FCA 2001 had, like its predecessor, become extremely fragmented, due to 10 
amendments in only 12 years. Nevertheless, some Finnish scholars have seen the FCA 
as a step towards a general law for all economic associations, since the FCA was 
firmly established on the principles of the Finnish Companies Act 624/2006.33 This 
is not only a Finnish trend, as similar steps have been taken, for instance, in Sweden, 
where significant amendments to the Swedish Act on Economic Associations 
1987:667 (SEAA) came into force in July 2016.34
The FCA consists of 28 chapters which are divided into 364 sections. The FCA 
covers such issues as the general principles of cooperative law, incorporation and 
dissolution, the rights and obligations of the members of the cooperative, administra-
tion, capitalization and asset distribution, mergers and de-mergers and sanctions. On 
the other hand, such issues as insolvency and bankruptcy, bookkeeping and auditing 
and taxation are regulated by other laws which are not cooperative specific.35 The 
FCA governs all cooperatives registered according to Finnish law, and unlike many 
other countries – such as France and Italy – there are no separate laws for particular 
types of cooperatives.36 There is little published case law regarding the FCA, although 
the FCA is the most important source of law for Finnish cooperatives. This lack of 
case law also means that the general principles of cooperative law (which are laid 
down in Chapter 1 of the FCA) play an important role in supplementing the numerous 
casuistic rules.
Based on the abovementioned, this section can be concluded with the following 
observations: Finnish cooperative legislation has relatively deep roots, and, during 
the past 120 or so years, the Finnish Cooperative Act, through its four incarnations, 
has matured into one of the most coherent and modern cooperative laws in Europe. 
Since the FCA of 1901, it has been evident that legislation plays an important role in 
the development of cooperatives, and today the cooperative movement is, without 
doubt, thriving in Finland.37 Finnish cooperative law is extremely coherent; however, 
32 Hallituksen esitys (n 17) at 1-2.
33 Veikko Vahtera, Millaisille sääntelyratkaisuille Suomen yhteisölainsäädännön kokonaisuudistuk-
set rakentuvat? – Esimerkkinä uusi osuuskuntalaki 4 Defensor Legis 641 (2013).
34 See, e.g., Statens offentliga utredningar 2010:90. En ny lag om ekonomiska föreningar (Govern-
mental committee report concerning the SEAA) and Regeringens proposition 2015/16:4. Modernisering 
av lagen om ekonomiska föreningar (Governmental bill concerning the SEAA).
35 Some cooperative law scholars, in fact, argue that elements of other laws (e.g., tax laws, com-
petition laws and labor laws) should not be mixed with organizational cooperative legislation since 
this might turn cooperative law and cooperatives into political tools. See, e.g., Münkner (n 21) at 23. 
36 Fici (n 12) at 12.
37 It is, however, an interesting statistical fact that the number of Finnish cooperatives has changed 
quite considerably throughout history. E.g., between the 1950s and 1970s there were ca. 9,000 opera-
tional cooperatives but their number shrank to ca. 2,000 (mainly because of mergers) in the 1980s. See 
Hallituksen esitys (n 17) at 9. Since then, the number of registrations has been steadily increasing, and 
in July 2018 there were 4,287 operative cooperatives in Finland. See <www.prh.fi/fi/kaupparekisteri/
yritystenlkm/lkm.html> (accessed 23 October 2018). This is not a huge number, but it is important to 
remember that cooperatives function in all major branches of business, and some of them are very large, 
consisting of millions of members. See n 16.
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the number of casuistic norms has increased constantly. For smaller cooperatives, this 
can be a challenge, since the more detailed and technical the law becomes, the harder 
it is for entrepreneurs to operate without the support of lawyers. The more substantial 
problems, however, relate to the lack of case law and cooperative law research,38 and 
to companization and unequal tax treatment.39 These are not only Finnish problems 
but challenges which seem to arise in most Western jurisdictions. However, due to 
the challenges of space, these issues cannot be addressed further in this paper, and 
thus we shall next concentrate exclusively on the topic of companization.
3. The Objectives of Cooperatives and the General Principles of Cooperative 
Law – Reflections on the FCA
On an international level, the cornerstones of cooperative law are the 1995 ICA State-
ment on the Co-operative Identity (ICA Statement),40 the 2001 United Nations Guide-
lines on creating a supportive environment for the development of cooperatives (UN 
Guidelines)41 and the International Labor Organization Recommendation No. 193, 
published in 2002, concerning the promotion of cooperatives (ILO R. 193).42 These 
sources of law all aim to promote a globally shared conception of the values and 
principles of cooperatives, which were first introduced in the ICA Statement and 
thereafter officially recognized in the UN Guidelines and ILO R. 193.43 ILO R. 193, 
whose main purpose is to maintain cooperatives as distinct legal entities, is sometimes 
considered the main source of ‘public international cooperative law,’44 although in 
practice both the UN Guidelines and ILO R. 193 are merely expressions of ‘best 
38 See n 21.
39 See, e.g., Fici (n 12) at 58-59 who has argued that ‘tax law should be made consistent with the 
organizational law of cooperatives, which means that it should reflect the specificities of cooperatives 
that distinguish them from other business organizations, notably pro-profit capitalistic companies.’ See 
also Seppo Penttilä and Veikko Vahtera, Osuuskunta yhteisömuotona ja sen ylijäämänjaon verotuksen 
uudistaminen 3 Defensor Legis 486-487 (2015), who have shown that Finland has, in fact, worsened 
the tax treatment of traditional cooperatives. 
40 See <http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles> (accessed 23 Octo-
ber 2018).
41 Supportive Environment for Cooperatives. A Stakeholder Dialogue on Definitions, Prerequisites 
and Process of Creation. Report of an Expert Group Meeting held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 15-17 
May 2002 (Division for Social Policy and Development Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
UN, New York 2003) Annex I.
42 See <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_
CODE:R193> (accessed 23 October 2018).
43 Borzaga & Galera (n 3) at 14 and Münkner (21) at 20.
44 See, e.g., Hagen Henrÿ, Public International Cooperative Law in Dante Carcogna, Antonio 
Fici & Hagen Henrÿ (eds), International Handbook of Cooperative Law, 67 and 71 (Berlin; Springer, 
2013), who argues that ILO R. 193 carries more legal weight than the recommendations of other inter-
national organizations and that ILO R. 193 is ‘legally binding.’ Henrÿ does not, however, define what 
this means in practice. 
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practices’ in drafting cooperative law.45 In other words, they are not to be understood 
as model laws or common legislative frameworks such as the European Cooperative 
Society (SCE) regulation of 2003.46
In the following sections 3.1-5, the extent of the companization of the FCA is tested 
using the ICA Statement as a benchmark.47 The analysis is conducted in such a way 
that that the principles of the ICA Statement (Cooperative Principles) are first intro-
duced briefly, after which the FCA is compared to them. The structure of the analysis 
follows the systematics of the ICA Statement; hence, the objective of cooperatives is 
not assessed separately, as it is encompassed in the Cooperative Principles. Further-
more, it should be stressed that as the purpose of this article is not to explain coop-
erative law on a general level but to study the phenomenon of companization, the 
ICA Statement is not analyzed in detail. Moreover, as Hans-H. Münkner has aptly 
remarked, the ICA Statement is the ‘smallest common denominator’ for national 
cooperative laws, and it deliberately leaves room for interpretation.48
3.1. Voluntary and Open Membership
The first Cooperative Principle, the so-called ‘open door’ principle, is titled ‘Volun-
tary and Open Membership, and it states that
‘[c]o-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all persons able to use their 
services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, 
social, racial, political or religious discrimination.’
The legal nature of cooperative membership is one of the ‘core structural character-
istics’49 of the cooperative form and an element which distinguishes cooperatives from 
45 Münkner (21) at 20.
46 The SCE is an EU association form provided by Council Regulation (EC) 1435/2003 on the Stat-
ute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE Regulation) [2003] L 207/1. Council Directive 2003/72/
EC supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of 
employees [2003] L 207/25 supplements this statute with rules on the involvement of employees. The 
SCE has been described as the ‘cooperative equivalent’ to the European Company (SE). Antonio Fici, 
The European Cooperative Society Regulation in Dante Carcogna, Antonio Fici & Hagen Henrÿ (eds), 
International Handbook of Cooperative Law, 116 (Berlin; Springer, 2013). Unfortunately the SCE Regu-
lation has had only limited success, and the reasons for this have been explained briefly in Commission 
Report (COM) 2012 72 final on the implementation of the SCE Regulation. 
47 In most countries, the ICA’s Cooperative Principles have been adhered to when drafting coopera-
tive law but without mentioning them explicitly. There are, however, some countries (such as Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and some countries of Latin America) which have made the principles part 
of their national legislation. Hans-H Münkner, Ten Lectures on Cooperative Law, 35 (2nd ed., Wien; Lit 
Verlag, 2016). On the other hand, in some other countries (such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands) 
the principles have been rather systematically ignored. Fici (n 9) at 53.
48 Münkner (n 21) at 21. See also Henrÿ (n 9) at 40.
49 The concept of ‘core structural characteristics’ is used here in the same sense in which Henry 
Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman use it in their famous analysis of the business corporation. See Armour 
et al. (n 8) at 5-15. 
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companies: cooperatives are person-based associations, while companies are capital-
based organizations.50 Furthermore, it is important to remember that the ‘shares’ 
assigned by a cooperative differ essentially from the shares of a company.51 A coop-
erative share does not determine the extent of a member’s governance and capital 
rights; rather, it is merely a condition for membership, i.e., an ‘entrance fee.’52 In fact, 
it might be appropriate to term cooperative shares ‘compulsory capital contributions’ 
(or ‘membership shares’53 or ‘advance payments for future services’)54 to make a clear 
distinction between them and the shares of a company.55
The voluntary nature of membership is not, on the other hand, a distinctive feature 
of the cooperative in comparison to companies, since neither membership of a coop-
erative nor company shares can be obtained without the consent of the member/
potential shareholder.56 Voluntary membership can, however, be understood in a 
broader sense to encompasses also the freedom to withdraw from the cooperative;57 
i.e., the open door principle applies both ways – to entrance and exit. Here coopera-
tives differ essentially from companies, where the shareholder has no such freedom 
of exit in relation to her/his shares, which bind her/him as a shareholder to the com-
pany.58
The concept of ‘open membership’ has raised some discussion as to whether coop-
eratives should be open to anyone who is able to use their services and willing to 
accept the responsibilities of membership or whether cooperatives should be open 
only to the extent that a cooperative is prohibited from refusing membership on, for 
instance, gender, social, racial, political or religious grounds. This debate is not 
explained in detail here, since today there seems to be a broad consensus that the 
exclusive purpose of the open door principle is to prevent the occurrence of artificial 
and unreasonable restrictions on cooperative membership, or as Antonio Fici puts it, 
‘to ensure that a cooperative does not become a sort of closed club where benefits are 
50 See, e.g., Fici (n 12) at 38 and Münkner (n 47) at 91-92. 
51 Ville Pönkä, Osuuskunnan jäsenen erottamisesta 5 Lakimies 673-674 (2016) and The Legal 
Nature of Cooperative Membership 7 Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity 2 (2018).
52 Fici (n 12) at 35-36 and 38.
53 Henrÿ (n 1) at 38. Furthermore, Münkner calls cooperative shares ‘classical shares’. Münkner 
(n 9) at 81.
54 Franz C Helm, The Economics of Co-operative Enterprise, 10 (London; University of London 
Press, 1968).
55 In countries like Finland and Sweden, it has also been acknowledged that membership of a 
cooperative and holding shares in a company differ essentially from one another. Then again, member-
ship of a cooperative and membership of an association have been recognized as rather similar legal 
constructions, although cooperatives are business organizations (like companies) and associations are 
non-profit (ideal) consortiums. In fact, in Sweden cooperatives are called economic associations (Swe. 
ekonomiska föreningar), not cooperatives (Swe. andelslag). See Curt Olsson, Osuuskuntaoikeus, 67 (3rd 
ed., Helsinki; Suomen Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1982) and Pönkä (n 51) at 674.
56 I.e., no one can be forced to be a member of a cooperative or to accept shares in a company.
57 Münkner (n 9) at 97 and (n 47) at 94.
58 The shares of a company cannot be abandoned or destroyed by their holder, which means that 
the shareholder is bound to her/his shares until someone either takes (purchases, inherits, redeems etc.) 
them or the company ceases to exist. 
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shared only among current members.’59 In light of the open door principle, it is also 
necessary that member exclusions are treated as exceptional measures60 and that they 
are never based on such unjust factors as those listed above.
In Finland – and, among others, Sweden – understanding of the legal nature of 
cooperative membership is similar to that of international cooperative law.61 There-
fore, the provisions of the FCA are generally in harmony with the open door principle. 
First, in Chapter 1, section 3(1) of the FCA, the cooperative is defined as an organiza-
tion whose membership, shares and share capital have not been determined in advance. 
This rule promotes the social function of the cooperative by making it an entity whose 
benefits can be shared by the largest possible number of persons. Companies, on the 
other hand – even those which are considered ‘open’ or ‘public’ – are not open in the 
same sense as cooperatives.62
Later in Chapter 3 of the FCA, specific rules on the application and beginning of 
membership, as well as withdrawal and exclusion from the cooperative, are laid down. 
According to these rules, the cooperative has wide discretion over membership selec-
tion, as no person has an universal right (or obligation) to become a member of a 
cooperative. Cooperatives may not discriminate between potential members on unjust 
personal grounds,63 but even so, a cooperative cannot be forced to accept somebody 
as a member.64 As a counterweight to the wide discretion in membership selection, 
members have the right to withdraw from the cooperative whenever they please and 
without any specific reason. The FCA provides only one exception to this rule, as it 
may be stipulated in the cooperative’s bylaws that the right of a member to resign 
may be suspended until the lapse of a fixed period, which may be no longer than three 
years from the beginning of the membership. Furthermore, the FCA limits the coop-
erative’s right to exclude members in instances where the member has neglected an 
obligation ensuing from membership. Other grounds for exclusion can, however, be 
included in the bylaws of the cooperative.
In light of the above, the FCA seems to conform quite precisely to the open door 
principle. Nevertheless, some signs of companization do exist. First, the FCA cur-
rently permits cooperatives to have just one member.65 In cooperative law theory (and 
unlike company law theory, where the shareholder is conceived as an anonymous 
investor), this is considered a somewhat problematic deviation from the ideal of the 
59 Fici (n 12) at 38, Henrÿ (n 1) at 55 and 72 and Münkner (n 9) at 9 7-98, 105 and (n 47) at 93.
60 Henrÿ (n 1) at 75.
61 Pönkä (n 51) at 672-675. 
62 Fici (n 12) at 56-57.
63 The non-discrimination rule can be derived from Sec. 6(2) of the Constitution of Finland 
731/1999, but it is not stated explicitly in the FCA.
64 However, for cooperatives which produce consumer necessities, the possibilities to reject new 
members are limited to quite exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Olsson (n 55) at 63-65, Pönkä (n 
51) at 674, Pöyhönen (n 31) at 63 and Marjos Rapola, Kysymys pääsemisestä osuuskunnan jäseneksi 
de lege ferenda 2 Lakimies 492 (1952).
65 See Hallituksen esitys (n 17) at 20-21, where the one-member requirement is explained by the 
fact that the previous three-member requirement made the incorporation of a cooperative unreasonably 
complicated and in practice the requirement was easily circumvented. 
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cooperative as a platform for member cooperation (and not asset partitioning), since 
it is obvious that in single member cooperatives no actual cooperation can exist.66 That 
said, it is not self-evident that cooperative law should necessitate a certain minimum 
number of members. These kinds of requirements tend to be based on artificial 
assumptions of, e.g., the number of persons required for actual cooperation to exist, 
and even though a cooperative is established by one person, it does not mean that it 
will remain as a ‘one-man society.’ Currently, European countries seem to require an 
average of three members, with Finland and the Netherlands appearing as the only 
single-member jurisdictions.67
Second, the FCA has introduced investor shares (Fi. osake), which differ essen-
tially from traditional cooperative shares (Fi. osuus).68 These investor shares resemble 
the shares of a company,69 with the exception that their holder’s governance and 
financial rights depend on what has been stipulated in the bylaws of the cooperative. 
The purpose of this new instrument is to enhance the capitalization possibilities of 
cooperatives, and the FCA even permits the listing of both investor and traditional 
shares.70 Although investor shares do not, as such, transform cooperatives into capi-
tal-based companies, their introduction is a clear sign of the companization of coop-
erative law.71 Moreover, bylaw autonomy regarding the governance and financial 
rights of these instruments is so broad that it is even possible to establish a coopera-
tive where capital contributions play a more significant de facto role than member 
participation. In cooperative law theory, such cooperatives are known as ‘dividend 
cooperatives’ or ‘capital cooperatives.’72
66 Fici (n 12) at 25 fn 84 and 54.
67 For the Netherlands, see Ger JH van der Sangen, Netherlands in Dante Carcogna, Antonio Fici 
& Hagen Henrÿ (eds), International Handbook of Cooperative Law, 548-549 (Berlin; Springer, 2013).
68 In the English language there are no concepts which could be used to make a clear distinction 
between the two different types of shares recognized by the FCA. Some researchers have, however, 
used the term ‘investor share’ in a similar context. See Fabio R Chaddad and Michael L Cook, Under-
standing New Cooperative Models: As Ownership-Control Rights Typology 26 Review of Agricultural 
Economics 3, 357-358.
69 Some Finnish authors, however, insist that the investor shares of a cooperative and the shares 
of a company are significantly different instruments. See Raimo Immonen, Jaakko Ossa and Seppo 
Villa, Osuuskunnan pääoman hallinta. Osuuskunta-, kirjanpito- ja verolainsäädännön rajapinta muo-
dostettaessa ja järjesteltäessä osuuskunnan omaa pääomaa sekä jaettaessa osuuskunnan varoja, 22-23 
(Helsinki; Alma Talent, 2015).
70 According to Ch. 5, sec. 2 of the FCA, cooperatives which have listed shares are called ‘listed 
cooperatives.’ No cooperative has yet been listed in Finland, but in other countries cooperative list-
ings have occurred. See, e.g., OF van Bekkum and J Bijman, Innovations in Cooperative Ownership: 
Converted and Hybrid Listed Cooperatives in S Rajagoplan, Cooperatives in 21st Century. The Road 
Ahead, 34-56 (Hyderabad, India; The ICFAI University Press, 2007).
71 Some scholars, however, see such investor shares as a desirable instruments. See, e.g., Cliff, 
Mills, Past, Present and Future in Rob Harrison, People Over Capital. The Co-operative Alternative 
to Capitalism, 54 (Oxford; New Internationalist Publications, 2013): ‘The problem of the co-operative 
world today is that it does not have something comparable to the company share, which it can hold up 
and say – use this for your savings, and help to secure an alternative future.’ 
72 Münkner (n 47) at 14.
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3.2. Democratic Member Control
According to the second Cooperative Principle,
‘[c]o-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who 
actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and women 
serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary 
co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-
operatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner.’
In cooperative law theory, this rule is often phrased simply as the ‘one member, one 
vote’ principle. It means that all members of the cooperative should have just one 
vote at the general meeting (or other similar organ); however, national legislators 
have adopted many deviations from this democratic rule. Nevertheless, some jurisdic-
tions strictly interpret the one member, one vote principle, and, in order to avoid the 
concentration of voting rights in larger families, some laws even allow just one person 
per household to hold membership of a cooperative.73 The modern trend, however, 
seems to be the exact opposite, and, as mentioned, national laws often grant coop-
eratives some leeway regarding the principle.74 For instance, in the U.S. many states 
permit a system where every member has at least one vote at the general meeting and 
extra votes are added in proportion to a member’s equity or volume of patronage.75 
Furthermore, according to Article 59(2) of the SCE Regulation, a cooperative’s 
bylaws may ‘provide for a member to have a number of votes determined by his/her 
participation in the cooperative activity other than by way of capital contribution.’
In the second Cooperative Principle deviations from the one member, one vote 
principle are in primary acceptable as long as certain ‘safeguards’ are retained, i.e., 
normative precautions to prevent cooperatives from transforming into non-democratic 
organizations.76 Here, the cooperative movement has diverged from Charles Gide’s 
conception of the cooperative as a ‘miniature republic’ where the equality of its mem-
bers is ensured by the ‘one man one vote’ maxim.77 One must, however, remember 
that sometimes it is crucial for the existence and development of cooperatives that 
their governance structures can be, at least to some extent, tailored to meet the 
73 Johnston Birchall, People-Centered Businesses. Co-operatives, Mutuals and the Idea of Member-
ship, 197 (Houndmills; Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
74 Fici (n 12) at 50 and Münkner (n 9) at 118 and (n 47) at 37.
75 Bruc e J Reynolds, The One Member-One Vote Rule in Cooperatives 15 Journal of Coopera-
tives 48-9 (2000). Reynolds has also analyzed thoroughly the positive and negative effects of the rule 
of proportional voting. In brief, his analysis shows that although some cooperative theorists object to 
the idea of proportional voting, all seem to agree that cooperatives should have the freedom to decide 
whether or not to deviate from the one member, one vote principle. 
76 Fici (n 12) at 51 and Münkner (n 9) at 118 and (n 47) at 37.
77 Charles Gide, Consumers’ Co-operative Societies, 100 [translated from the French by the staff 
of the Co-operative Reference Library, Dublin] (New York; Alfred A Knopf, 1922).
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demands and expectations of the most significant members and potential investors.78 
Furthermore, innovations such as proportional voting can even support the purpose 
of the cooperative as a society where cooperation is defined by member participation.79
The one member, one vote principle has also been acknowledged by Finnish leg-
islators as a central rule: According to Chapter 5, section 13 of the FCA, at the general 
meeting one member has one vote on all matters to be considered. It may, however, 
be stipulated in the bylaws that members have a differentiated number of votes; nev-
ertheless, the number of votes held by one member may not exceed twenty times the 
number of votes held by another member. This 20:1 vote restriction does not concern 
second-level cooperatives whose bylaws stipulate that the majority of members must 
be cooperatives or other legal persons or that one of the members must be a public 
entity. Such cooperatives basically have unlimited bylaw autonomy regarding the 
number of votes their members possess.
Considering how differentiated the voting rights of members can be, the FCA 
seems to permit – and without any specific reason80 – rather extensive deviation from 
the one member, one vote principle compared to other European countries.81 Even so, 
the FCA is not in conflict with the second Cooperative Principle, since safeguarded 
deviations, as mentioned, are generally acceptable. What makes the FCA somewhat 
problematic, however, is the fact that the number of votes a member possesses can 
be determined by her or his capital contributions.82 In fact, it is even stated in the 
Governmental bill on the FCA 2001 that cooperatives should be allowed to adopt 
similar governance structures to those of companies, since this enhances their capi-
talization possibilities. It has also been argued that deviations from the one member, 
one vote principle are crucial for cooperatives whose business operations (such as 
health care and architectural services) necessitate extensive investment.83
78 The one member, one vote principle seems particularly ineffective when cooperative members 
do not form a homogenous interest group, or, as Holmström puts it, in such cooperatives the potential 
value of the vote is often lost in member quarrels and indecisiveness. Holmström (n 4) at 498.
79 See similarly Ivan V Emelianoff, Economic Theory of Cooperation: Economic Structure of Coop-
erative Organizations, 195 (University of California, Center for Cooperatives, 1995) and Fici (n 12) at 
50. See differently Münkner (n 9) at 112.
80 It is also worth noting that the FCA does not restrict the decision-making situations where mul-
tiple voting rights may be exercised. In cooperative law theory, Henrÿ has found this problematic, since 
he believes that cooperative law should prohibit the use of plural votes in ‘important matters.’ See Henrÿ 
(n 1) at 85. Here one must, however, remember that the general meeting is the highest decision-making 
organ of the cooperative, and one can argue that all the matters it handles are important. Furthermore, 
distinguishing important matters from trivial ones can be problematic per se.
81 See Carmen Quintana Cocolina et al., The Power of Cooperation – Cooperatives Europe Key 
Figures 2015 (Cooperatives Europe, 2016).
82 See Henrÿ (n 1) at 85: ‘In no case … may plural voting rights be granted on the basis of the 
amount of financial contributions by a member.’ and Fici (n 12) at 51: ‘[V]oting power in a coopera-
tive could never be based on capital contributions by members, as normally happens in companies.’
83 Hallituksen esitys (n 29) at 51. The same justifications have been repeated in the Governmental 
bill concerning the current FCA. Furthermore, it has been claimed that deviations from the one member, 
one vote principle are necessary for cooperatives to be able to tailor incentives for their employees and 
managers. See Hallituksen esitys (n 17) at 57.
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Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that, according to Chapter 4, section 3(1) of 
the FCA, the shares of a cooperative – traditional or investor – do not give their holder 
the right to vote at the general meeting. This means that only members have voting 
rights, even though the number of a member’s votes may be determined by the num-
ber of shares she/he possesses, i.e., by the amount of capital contributed.84 In light of 
the second Cooperative Principle, it is essential that non-member shareholders (and 
in general all non-member parties) are unable to vote at the general meeting, since 
cooperatives are member, not investor, controlled entities.85 On the other hand, the 
second Cooperative Principle also states that cooperatives are democratic organiza-
tions, which makes it necessary to assess how far national laws should allow coop-
eratives to depart from the requirement of member equality in decision-making. This 
is something which would require thorough research, and at least the Finnish system 
– where in first-level cooperatives one member can have twenty times the number of 
votes of another member and without any specific reason – has simply been copied 
from company law. Therefore, the question, which Finnish legislators have unfortu-
nately ignored, is where the numbers (20:1 votes) come from and whether they allow 
cooperatives to diverge too far from Gide’s ideal, allowing them to transform into 
non-democratic, company-like organizations.86
3.3. Members’ Economic Participation
According to the third Cooperative Principle,
‘[m]embers contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their 
co-operative. At least part of that capital is usually the common property of the 
co-operative. Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital 
subscribed as a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or 
all of the following purposes: developing their co-operative, possibly by setting 
up reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; benefi ting members in 
proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; and supporting other activ-
ities approved by the membership.’
84 Immonen, Ossa and Villa (n 69) at 22 and Mähönen and Villa (n 17) at 61-62.
85 This rule is also supported by the fourth Cooperative Principle, according to which, coopera-
tives are autonomous and independent organizations controlled by their members. See section 3.4. In 
the Netherlands legislators have, however, departed even from this rule and allowed voting rights to be 
introduced for non-members, although with certain limitations. See van der Sangen (n 67) at 554-555. 
See also Henrÿ (n 1) at 86, who has argued that if the law grants voting rights to non-members, it must 
be ensured that they cannot outweigh ‘regular’ members at the general meeting.
86 Similar issues have raised concerns amongst company law scholars. The idea behind the one 
share, one vote principle is that the capital contributions of the shareholders should reflect the volume 
of their governance rights; hence some argue that no-vote and multiple-vote shares should be forbidden, 
as such instruments contradict this theory. See, e.g., Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee, One Share – One 
Vote: the Theory 12 Rev Financ 1 (2008).
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It is from this principle that the two core characteristics of the cooperative’s economic 
structure are derived. First, capital contribution is a precondition for cooperative 
membership, and ‘entrance fees’ form an essential part of a cooperative’s capital.87 
This capital can vary, as can the number of members, and national laws rarely provide 
for the minimum capital requirements of cooperatives.88 As mentioned above in sec-
tion 3.1, capital contributions constitute an economic bond between the cooperative 
and its members, and this bond is structured as a (traditional) share. Nevertheless, 
these shares do not possess the same structural characteristics as company shares, 
and, in particular, the financial rights of a member/shareholder of a cooperative are 
far more restricted than the financial rights of a company shareholder.89
Second, the third Cooperative Principle suggests that cooperative surplus should 
be used mainly to support the mission of the cooperative as an organization promot-
ing the aggregate welfare of its members as consumers, providers and/or workers.90 
It has been even argued that in order to show that it has acted effectively in favor of 
its members, a cooperative should not generate any divisible profits (‘returns’).91 This 
is, of course, only a theory, but it demonstrates that the main purpose of the coopera-
tive should not be to maximize returns. However, as mentioned earlier in section 3.1, 
so-called dividend (or capital) cooperatives have arisen in recent years, and these 
organizations have abandoned the classical cooperative model in favor of striving for 
high return on capital investment.92
According to Chapter 9, section 1 of the FCA, a member of a cooperative must 
take at least one traditional share.93 In addition, the cooperative’s bylaws can stipulate 
that members may/must take additional traditional shares and/or investor shares and 
that both traditional and investor shares can also be given to non-members. Further-
more, according to Chapter 9, section 2 of the FCA, cooperatives may issue – even 
without the support of their bylaws – new traditional and investor shares to both 
members and non-members. The FCA provides no minimum capital requirements for 
cooperatives; however, according to Chapter 16, section 7, a cooperative must have 
87 The question of whether the capital contribution is regarded as a precondition for membership or 
a consequence of acquisition of membership is irrelevant (it is merely a ‘chicken-and-egg’ dilemma), 
but what is important is to understand that in cooperative law theory membership and minimum capital 
contribution are considered inseparable. Münkner (n 47) at 162.
88 Fici (n 12) at 36-37. The SCE makes a noteworthy exception to the abovementioned, since 
according to Art. 3(2) of the SCE Regulation, the subscribed cooperative capital shall be no less than 
30,000 euros.
89 E.g. Seppo Pöyhönen argued in his doctoral thesis that the financial rights of the members of 
Finnish cooperatives are relatively weak and that the economic interests of cooperatives and their mem-
bers are asymmetric. See Pöyhönen (n 20) at 351-353. 
90 Fici (n 12) at 39.
91 Ibid.
92 Münkner (n 47) at 13-14.
93 Although all the traditional shares of a cooperative are similar, if not stipulated otherwise in 
the bylaws, some Finnish authors distinguish traditional shares which must be taken when joining the 
cooperative (Fi. perusosuus) from traditional shares given later for members and/or non-members. See, 
e.g., Pöyhönen (n 31) at 236. In practice, such systematizations have only academic value.
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a reserve fund where five percent of the surplus from the financial year shall be cred-
ited. When calculating the surplus, possible losses from the preceding financial years 
may be taken into account, and the reserve fund must be augmented up to 2,500 euros.
The sections summarized above demonstrate that although the FCA is very permis-
sive regarding capitalization methods, it is, nevertheless, in harmony with the third 
Cooperative Principle: It emphasizes the centrality of members’ control of the orga-
nization and, as explained earlier in section 3.2, non-member shareholders cannot 
have voting rights in a Finnish cooperative. In fact, it is even possible to argue that 
the sources of cooperative capital are irrelevant as long as the organization remains 
under its members’ democratic control and independent of external influences.94 It 
must, however, be noted that in practice the strict requirement of member control 
makes cooperative shares rather unattractive to equity investors, who often demand 
control rights in the target firm. Currently there are no listed cooperatives registered 
under Finnish law.95
On the other hand, legal restrictions on surplus distribution are essential for secur-
ing cooperative identity.96 Since the purpose of the cooperative is to promote the 
aggregate welfare of its members as consumers, providers and/or workers, not to 
maximize returns, it is crucial that cooperative surplus is used primarily to increase 
the direct and/or indirect value of cooperative membership. This principle is adopted 
as the main rule in the FCA, and, according to Chapter 16, section 5, cooperative 
surplus may be distributed to the members only if this is explicitly permitted by the 
bylaws. Furthermore, the Governmental bill on the FCA emphasized that the primary 
use of surpluses should be investments which aim to ensure the cooperative’s long-
term provision of comprehensive, high-quality services.97
Furthermore, it may be stipulated in the cooperative’s bylaws that the sole purpose 
of the cooperative is to generate profits for its shareholders, which means that a Finn-
ish cooperative can operate like a de facto company.98 This possibility has raised some 
concerns amongst legal scholars, since bylaw autonomy regarding the purpose of the 
94 See, e.g., Fici (n 12) at 38, who argues that ‘cooperative capital does not seem to play any role 
other than that of providing the entity with financial means for conducting its business and fulfilling its 
objectives.’ See similarly Münkner (n 9) at 142. Cooperative autonomy and independence is discussed 
later in section 3.4.
95 See n 70. See also Münkner (n 47) at 160-161, who has analyzed the structural weaknesses of 
cooperatives in the field of financing.
96 See similarly Fici (n 9) at 59, who also points out that in many European countries surplus dis-
tribution is not covered by mandatory rules but entrusted entirely to cooperative bylaws.
97 Hallituksen esitys (n 17) at 105.
98 Pönkä (n 51) at 672 and Vahtera (n 33) at 635. See also Hallituksen esitys (n 17) at 109. E.g. 
in Germany this would lead to the cooperative being dissolved ex officio. Münkner (n 47) at 75. On 
the other hand, in Luxembourg, for example, the situation seems to be just the opposite. There coop-
eratives can be organized as ‘sociétés anonymes,’ i.e., public companies. Yoanna Staechele-Stefanova, 
The Luxembourg Cooperative Company Organized as a Public Limited Liability Company (société 
cooperative organisée comme une société anonyme «CoopSA») 2 ACE (Comptabilité, fiscalité, audit, 
droit des affaires au Luxembourg) 3 (2014).
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cooperative may compromise its cooperative identity99 and even encourage entrepre-
neurs to choose the cooperative form for unintended reasons.100 Furthermore, it is 
important to assess whether there is an actual need for cooperatives to discard the 
single most important element which distinguishes them from companies. Currently 
at least, there are no signs of general interest among Finnish cooperatives in maximiz-
ing shareholder value, and there is even some empirical evidence that paying little or 
no returns is largely the result of cooperative choice rather than legal constraints.101
3.4. Autonomy and Independence
The fourth Cooperative Principle is called ‘Autonomy and Independence,’ and it 
states that
‘[c]o-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their mem-
bers. If they enter into agreements with other organisations, including governments, 
or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic 
control by their members and maintain their co-operative autonomy.’
This principle complements, in particular, the second Cooperative Principle (‘Demo-
cratic Member Control’) by emphasizing that cooperatives should remain independent 
from external influences to avoid either de jure or de facto control by outsiders such 
as public entities or investors.102 This means that both national lawmakers and coop-
eratives themselves must ensure that cooperative autonomy and member control are 
not restricted beyond a certain threshold. The extent to which the state should be 
allowed to interfere with the internal decision-making of cooperatives and the degree 
to which cooperatives should be allowed to delegate their decision-making powers 
to non-member parties is a matter of debate which cannot be addressed here further.103 
Nevertheless, some important observations can be made.
First, the fourth Cooperative Principle does not prohibit delegated management 
with a board structure as long as the general meeting (or ‘assembly’) of the members 
remains the supreme authority of the cooperative, being in charge of all fundamental 
99 See, e.g., Gábor G Szabó, ‘Co-operative Identity’ – A Theoretical Concept for Dy namic Analysis 
of Practical Co-operation: The Dutch Case (2005) Paper prepared for presentation at the XIth Interna-
tional Congress of the EAAE 7-8, who has portrayed the consequences of cooperatives losing their iden-
tity. See also Henrÿ (n 9), who has explained why we should protect cooperative identity through law.
100 Such reasons include unfounded tax benefits and the absence of minimum capital requirements. 
Vahtera (n 33) at 642.
101 Jeffre y S Royer, Cooperative Principles and Equity Financing: A Critical Discussion 7 Journal 
of Agricultural Cooperation 96 (1992).
102 See also Fici (n 9) at 49, who argues that the fourth Cooperative Principle ‘strengthens the 
effects’ of the second principle. 
103 See also Fici (n 12) at 53, who emphasizes that, in general, the extent to which ownership and 
control of a cooperative must be linked is unclear. See also Münkner (n 47) at 42, who notes that in 
industrialized countries – meaning non-socialist countries – the relationship between the state and coop-
eratives is regulated only to a very limited extent in cooperative-specific legislation.
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decisions, including the election of board members.104 In international cooperative 
law research, some debate has arisen on whether some or all board members should 
also be members of the cooperative or representatives of its different interest groups.105 
This is a matter where national lawmakers have wide discretion, but in general the 
governance structures of cooperatives seem to vary little between jurisdictions.106 In 
some countries, such as Finland, the governance structures of cooperatives and com-
panies are virtually identical, but this cannot be considered a sign of companization, 
since such formalistic similarities do not change the fact that cooperatives are mem-
ber-controlled organizations.107
Another interesting question regarding the fourth Cooperative Principle is whether 
voting agreements between cooperative members and outsiders are legally enforce-
able. This question is connected with the topic of companization, since, in company 
law, shareholders’ agreements, voting agreements and other control-enhancement 
mechanisms (CEMs) are generally considered legally binding, whereas, in coopera-
tive law theory, all arrangements and instruments directly or indirectly affecting the 
control of the cooperative are often regarded as null and void.108 This means that 
agreements between members of a cooperative on how they shall later vote at the 
general meeting and agreements where a member gives a non-member party (e.g., an 
investor) the right to decide how she/he shall vote are not legally enforceable.109 Con-
sidering the personal nature of the membership of a cooperative and the fact that 
national cooperative laws – including the FCA – often restrict the use of proxies, it 
is easy to agree with the prevailing international doctrine: As Münkner puts it, the 
right to vote is a ‘personal’ right,110 a right which cannot be passed on to another 
person. In Finland, it also seems unlikely that voting agreements in the cooperative 
context are legally enforceable, although this interpretation cannot be directly derived 
from the wording of the FCA.111
104 Fici (n 12) at 53.
105 See, e.g., Fici (n 9) at 49 and (n 12) at 53-4. In general, the trend seems for cooperatives to be 
managed by non-professional members who lack business experience. Banks and other potential credi-
tors are aware of this problem and are therefore unwilling to finance cooperatives without additional 
safeguards. Often this means that members must give personal guarantees for business loans, but what is 
interesting is that some countries require by law that cooperative bylaws provide for additional liability 
for their members (limited or unlimited) for the cooperative’s debts. See Münkner (n 47) at 167. See 
also Charles Gould, Co-operatives: The Shape of Things to Come in Jonathan Michie, Joseph R Blasi 
& Carlo Borzaga (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Mutual, Co-operative and Co-owned Business, 603 
(New York; OUP, 2017), who states that cooperatives are starting to prefer ‘professional managers.’
106 See, e.g., Cocolina et al. (n 81).
107 It has been even argued that it is in the interests of the members of the cooperative to organize 
its governance structure in a ‘strictly businesslike’ manner. Münkner (n 47) at 125.
108 See, e.g., Fici (n 12) at 54. See also Fici (n 9) at 49.
109 However, in the case Akasa Holdings, LLC v. Sweet 2014 NY Slip Op 01822, a voting agreement 
between ‘tenant-shareholders’ was considered legally binding.
110 Münkner (n 47) at 99.
111 This question has not been assessed by Finnish courts or legal scholars.
VILLE PÖNKÄ96
3.5. Other Cooperative Principles
The first four Cooperative Principles, which have been introduced above, offer 
national lawmakers concrete guidelines on how to draft cooperative law. These prin-
ciples deal with issues which require legislative measures to ensure that the identity 
of the cooperative form is maintained and preserved. The last three Cooperative Prin-
ciples (principles five, six and seven), on the other hand, focus on the cooperative 
movement, i.e., they deal with questions of how people (both cooperative insiders and 
outsiders) can be made more aware of the nature and benefits of the cooperative form 
(the fifth principle) and how cooperatives should operate to best serve the interests 
of their members and the community as a whole (the sixth and seventh principles).
The fifth, sixth and seventh Cooperative Principles read as follows:
‘Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected repre-
sentatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the 
development of their co-operatives. They inform the general public – particularly 
young people and opinion leaders – about the nature and benefi ts of co-operation 
[‘Education, Training and Information’].’
‘Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-oper-
ative movement by working together through local, national, regional and inter-
national structures [‘Co-operation Amongst Co-operatives’].’
‘Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through 
policies approved by their members [‘Concern for Community’].’
These principles have rarely led to legislative measures on a national level, and even 
in those jurisdictions where the Cooperative Principles have been enshrined in law, 
Principles five, six and seven are often treated as soft law or as recommendations on 
good practices rather than requirements for compulsory action.112 Furthermore, since 
the principles on education, training and information, cooperation amongst coopera-
tives, and concern for community focus on the cooperative movement (not on coop-
erative identity), they do not cover companization-sensitive issues, in contrast to the 
first four principles. Therefore, the last three Cooperative Principles are not discussed 
further here; however, two general observations should nevertheless be made.
First, cooperation amongst cooperatives plays a very important role in maintaining 
and preserving the cooperative identity because such cooperation – and especially 
cooperation on an international level – can serve as a counterweight to the trend 
toward companization. In jurisprudence Fici, for example, has argued that the current 
112 In Finland, Cooperative Principles five, six and seven have no references in the law. This does 
not, of course, mean that Finnish cooperatives do not follow them. As for cooperation amongst coopera-
tives, Finnish cooperatives have, e.g., a competent and active service organization, the Pellervo Society 
(see <http://pellervo.fi/english/>, accessed 23 October 2018), which is mentioned above in section 1.
REFLECTIONS ON THE FINNISH COOPERATIVES ACT [2019] EBLR 97
cooperative movement is ‘nation-centered,’113 which consequently means that the 
companization of cooperative law stems from the decisions of national lawmakers. 
Fici has also revealed many differences in the way national legislators understand 
cooperative identity, and today there unfortunately seem to be several cooperative 
laws whose compliance with Cooperative Principles is highly debatable.114 In order 
to prevent cooperative societies from transforming into cooperative companies, it is 
essential that the true nature of cooperative identity is universally understood, and the 
only way to attain such understanding is through international cooperation. Further-
more, if there is no genuine cooperation amongst cooperatives, the cooperative move-
ment will lack effective influence over national lawmakers and transnational 
communities like the EU.115
Second, the seventh Cooperative Principle regarding the social function of coop-
eratives is somewhat misleading, since it might give the impression that cooperatives 
are non-profit organizations aiming to promote the interests of the community in 
general. There are, of course, cooperatives which have adopted such a function,116 as 
well as so-called ‘hybrids’ which have both commercial and non-commercial ambi-
tions.117 Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the cooperative is to promote the wel-
fare of its members; i.e., the cooperative is a member-oriented business organization, 
not a social enterprise.118 Here cooperatives do not, in fact, radically differ from com-
panies, and Hansmann has even argued that the conventional investor-owned com-
pany is nothing more than a special type of producer cooperative.119 The reason for 
keeping this in mind is that cooperatives and companies are alternatives to one 
another; thus, identifying the cooperative as a non-profit organization might decrease 
its attractiveness to entrepreneurs. Understanding the cooperative as an alternative to 
the company also encompasses the idea that the company form is only one type of 
‘vehicle’ for business operations,120 thereby negating the rationale for transforming 
cooperatives into companies.
113 Fici (n 9) at 42.
114 Fici (n 9).
115 Furthermore, internationally oriented legal scholars tend to avoid nation-centered topics; hence, 
the international cooperation of cooperatives can also attract the attention of the academic community.
116 Cooperatives which aim to promote the interests of the community are known as ‘social coopera-
tives.’ Antonio Fici, Recognition and Legal Forms of Social Enterprise in Europe: A Critical Analysis 
from a Comparative Law Perspective 27 Eu ropean Business Law Review 659-662 (2016) and Guilia 
Galera, Social and Solidarity Co-operatives – An International Perspective in Jonathan Michie, Joseph 
R Blasi & Carlo Borzaga (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Mutual, Co-operative and Co-owned Busi-
ness (New York; OUP, 2017).
117 See, e.g., Münkner (n 47) at 13-14.
118 See similarly Antonio Fici, The Essential Role of Co-operative Law and Some Related Issues in 
Jonathan Michie, Joseph R Blasi & Carlo Borzaga (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Mutual, Co-operative 
and Co-owned Business, 540-541 (New York; OUP, 2017).
119 Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise, 12 (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, Eng-
land; The Belknap Press of HUP, 1996). See also Henry Hansmann, All Firms are Cooperatives – and 
so are Governments 2 Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity 1 (2013).
120 Or as Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel put it ‘[t]he corporation is a financin g device 
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4. Conclusions
The findings of this article show that the companization of cooperative law is not only 
a theoretical phenomenon; rather, there are also concrete signs of national cooperative 
laws adopting elements of company law. This trend towards companization seems to 
stem from globalization and the lack of a universal understanding of the true nature 
of cooperative identity. Companization is also facilitated by the unfortunate fact that 
several countries are failing to follow the ICA’s Cooperative Principles,121 which is 
partly the fault of the principles themselves: They are somewhat vague, partially 
outdated and quite open to interpretation.122 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the 
Cooperative Principles truly support and complement one another or whether some 
intrinsic conflict exists within cooperative law doctrine that is actually facilitating 
companization.123 On the other hand, one must also question the efficacy of pursuing 
more precise and comprehensive principles which would simultaneously suit the 
needs of cooperatives in general. Might there be, paradoxically, a risk that such rules 
would narrow the possibilities for utilizing the cooperative form as an alternative to 
the company form? Here, one must remember that a huge variety of cooperatives 
operate in nearly all imaginable branches of business, and it could even be argued 
that flexibility (i.e., openness to interpretation) is a strength rather than a weakness 
of the Cooperative Principles.
As mentioned in section 1, the FCA offers an interesting framework for the analy-
sis of companization, and as illustrated in sections 3.1-5, Finnish cooperative law has 
been consciously brought closer to company legislation. By comparing the FCA to 
international cooperative law theory – more precisely the ICA’s Cooperative Prin-
ciples – four points of concern regarding companization seem to emerge:
(1) First, according to the FCA, it is possible for a cooperative to have just one 
member, which contradicts the ideal of the cooperative as a platform for member 
cooperation.124
and is not otherwise distinctive’. See Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Corporate Contract 
1416 Colum. L. Rev. 1425 (1989).
121 See especially Cocolina et al. (n 81).
122 See similarly Fici (n 9). As a reaction to the criticism directed at the Cooperative Principles the 
ICA published so-called guidance notes in 2015 that explain how the principles should be applied in 
practice. See <https://ica.coop/en/blueprint-themes/identity/guidancenotes> (accessed 23 October 2018). 
Furthermore, the Study Group on European Cooperative Law (SGECOL) was established in 2011 
in Trento, Italy to draft Principles of European Cooperative Law (PECOL). In September 2017, the 
SGECOL finally published the Principles of European Cooperative Law: Principles, Commentaries 
and National Reports, written by Gemma Fajardo-García, Fici, Henrÿ, David Hiez, Deolinda A Meira, 
Münker and Ian Snaith.
123 E.g., the strict one member, one vote requirement can shift control of the organization from 
the members to the directors – especially in cooperatives with dispersed and heterogeneous ownership 
structures. In fact, Pöyhönen has recognized some signs of so-called managerial empire building within 
large Finnish cooperatives. Pöyhönen (n 20) at 135.
124 See section 3.1.
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(2) Second, the FCA has introduced so-called investor shares, which resemble the 
shares of a company. Although such instruments do not, as such, transform 
cooperatives into capital-based companies, their introduction is a clear sign of 
the companization of cooperative law.125
(3) Furthermore, the FCA allows somewhat extensive deviations from the one 
member, one vote principle, which contradicts the ideal of the cooperative as 
a democratic organization.126
(4) Finally, the FCA permits virtually unlimited bylaw autonomy regarding the 
purpose of the cooperative, and it may even be stipulated in the bylaws that 
the purpose of the cooperative is to generate profits for its shareholders. Hence, 
a Finnish cooperative can operate like a de facto company.127
Although these conclusions are based on Finnish law, similar signs of companization 
can be found in other countries, including some EU member states. To fully under-
stand the extent and consequences of the companization of cooperative law, national 
reflections on the topic are essential. Unfortunately, country-specific research data 
cannot be gathered without the support of the local academic community, since under-
standing companization requires in-depth knowledge of national legal doctrines, and 
observations regarding foreign law often result in misunderstandings and superficial 
findings.128 The future development of companization studies also requires mutual 
understanding of how companization should be measured and whether companization 
is, after all, a phenomenon worth fighting against or rather an inevitable, even some-




128 See similarly Fici (n 9) at 41, who also notes that in Europe alone there are at least six formally 
different models of cooperative legislation, which makes it even more difficult for a researcher to grasp 
foreign cooperative law. 
129 Furthermore, it should be critically assessed are the justifications for companization outdated as 
Henrÿ has claimed. Henrÿ (n 9) at 46.
